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DISSEISIN AND ADVERSE POSSESSION
PERCY Bol uwmm
No better illustration of the power of an apt phrase to make its own
way is likely to present itself than the case of adverse possession.
Apparently the first one to use it was Lord Mansfield in the great case
of Taylor d. Atkyns v. Horde' but he was seemingly not conscious of
phrasemaking for he did not use it in his onslaught on disseisin but
incidentally in discussing the statute of limitations. The law had
already become settled that not every wrongful possession would cause
the statute to run and this had been placed on the ground that it
required a disseisin to start the statute running,2 but after the scorn
Lord Mansfield had cast on the word disseisin,3 he was evidently loath
to use it in such a live matter as the running of the statute and hit on
adverse possession instead. Its usefulness in that connection was so
great that it was generally adopted and at the time of the reform
legislation of 1833 a "mere adverse possession"4 that would start the
statute running was being distinguished from a technical disseisin.5
Disseisin and "non-adverse possession' 7 alike fell with the Real
Property Limitation Act of 1833 and although the term adverse posses-
(1757, K. B.) i Burr. 6o, ii.
'Reading v. Rawsterne (1702, Q. B.) 2 Ld. Raym. 829. See Lightwood, Posses-
sion of Land (1894) 16o.
Taylor d. Atkyns v. Horde (1757, K. B.) i Burr. 6o, iio. See Bordwell,
Seisin and Disseisin. (1921) 34 HARv. L. R-v. 592, at p. 621.
'Doe d. Souter v. Hull (i822, K. B.) 2 Dowl. & R. 38.
"Doe d. Parker v. Gregory (1834, K. B.) 2 Ad. & El. i4. See Lightwood,
Possession, i6o.
' Sweet, Seisin (1896) 12 LAW Q. REv. 239; Title by "Adverse Possession (19o7)
i9 JuRlD. REv. 67.
'Pollock and Wright, Possession in the Common Law (1888) 9o; Lightwood,
Possession, I81.
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sion still lingers in England it has little significance there." In the
United States its fate was quite otherwise. A great law teacher
wondered at its displacement of disseisin.9 Perhaps it will be worth
while to attempt to show that the change was not one of mere words.
RE-ENTRY
It is common knowledge that the owner of land does not cease to
have legal possession by his moving off the land and allowing it to lie
idle.Y0 A fortiori was this true of the old seisin." Nor under like
circumstances did the disseisor lose his tortious seisin. He did not
lose his seisin by an abandonment of the premises, nor was the seisin
of the owner automatically restored. For this a re-entry or a continual
claim was necessary. 12  No such re-entry is necessary in the United
States in the case of adverse possession.' 3 It was held at an early
period that title draws to itself possession or seisin unless the land is in
the adverse possession of another,14 and this was applied not only to
vest the possession in the owner before entry,'5 but to revest it in
him after an adverse possessi6n falling short of the period of the statute
'Lightwood, Possession, 81. "If we wish to know the result of a person
acquiring title to land under the Real Property Limitation Act, we must look to
the act, and to the act alone... ." Sweet, Title by Adverse Possession (1907) 19
Juam. REv. 67.
g "This substitution of the term 'adverse possession' for disseisin is one of the




'Ibid.; Challis, The Squatters Case (1889) 5 LAW Q. REv. 185; Sweet,
op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 249.
"2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 192o) 1959; Ames, "Disseisin of Chattels,"
3 Select Essays in Anglo-Anerican Legal History (1909) 541, 577.
"Van Brunt v. Schenck (1814, N. Y.) ii Johns. 377, 385; Green v. Liter (1814,
U. S.) 8 Cranch, 229, 249; Hawk v. Senseinan (1820, Pa.) 6 Serg. & R. 2x; Jackson
v. Sellick (1811, N. Y.) 8 Johns. 2o2; Jackson v. Howe (1817, N. Y.) 14 Johns.
405; Rust v. Boston Mill Corporation (1828, Mass.) 6 Pick. 158, 170; Den ex
dem. Saxton v. Hunt (1845, N. J. Sup. Ct.) Spencer, 487, 491; Cresap's Lessee v.
Hutson (1850, Md.) 9 Gill, 269, 276; H. B. and J. W. Wallace's Note in 2 Smith
Lead. Cas. (5th Am. ed. 1866) 561; I Scribner, Dower (2d ed. 1883) 254; Free-
man, 85 Am. Dec. 322, note; Ames, Lectures on Legal History (1913) 229.
"Ibid. It was English law that "general property in real estate does not draw
to it possession, as that in personal property does" 5 Dane, Ame rican Law (1823)
ch. 172, art. 7, 12. And such still seems to be the general rule in England, so that
possession does not follow upon the acquisition of land without an entry. Light-
wood, Possession, 65; Ames, Lectures on Legal History (1913) 228. For the
influence of the law of chattels on the law of real property in this respect in the
United States, see Bush v. Bradley (18io, Conn.) 4 Day, 298, 3o6; Bird v. Clark
(i8o8, Conn.) 3 Day, 272, 277; Merwin v. Morris (1899) 71 Conn. 555, 573, 42
Atl. 855, 86I.
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of limitations.'" Hence it is fundamental that adverse possession must
be continuous. 7  A gap between adverse possessions starts the statute
to running de novo.Y8 Nor is re-entry in case of abandonment neces-
sary under the modern English Real Property Limitation Acts. But
the decision of the Privy Council' 9 to that effect did not pass without
a protest from Challis20 and a comment from Lightwood, 21 that it was a
departure from the old law of disseisin. Challis's protest was the occa-
sion for Sweet's memorable reply2 2 that the very object of the Real
Property Limitation Act of 1833 had been to rid the law of actions from
doctrines of seisin, disseisin and the like.
Neither in England nor in the *United States is it apparent that the
courts were conscious of departing from the old law in holding that
in cases of abandonment no entry was necessary to restore the posses-
sion.23 There was little or no attempt in either case to make out a
constructive re-entry24 or a remitter25 as there probably would have
been if the courts had thought of the right of the owner in terms of
right of entry and disseisin. Their modes of thought had changed
from the old ways. They were thinking in terms of ownership and
possession and the result seemed to follow as of course.
2 6
"Louisville Co. v. Philyaw (1889) 88 Ala. 264, 6 So. 837; Brown v.
Hanauer (1887) 48 Ark. 277, 3 S. W. 27; Costello v. Edson (89o) 44 Minn.
135, 46 N. W. 299; Malloy v. Bruden (1882) 86 N. C. 251; Cunningham v. Patton
(847, Pa.) 6 Barr, 355, 358, 359; Taylor's Devisees v. Burnsides (1844, Va.) i
Gratt. I65, 202; Ames, 3 Select Essays, 577.
'Brandt v. Ogden (18o6, N. Y.) i Johns. 156; Jarrett v. Stevens (892) 36
W. Va. 445, 450, 15 S. E. 177, 178; 2 C. J. 80.
18Supra note 17.
' Trustees' Agency Co. v. Short (1888, P. C.) L. R. 13 A. C. 793.
' The Squatter's Case (889) 5 LAW Q. REv. 185, reprinted as App'x III,




Seisin (1896) 12 LAW Q. REv. 239, 248. See also Challis, op. cit. supra note 3.
, Nor does Ames seem conscious of this. See Ames, 3 Select Essays, 577.
There is a dictum in Malloy v. Bruden (1882) 86 N. C. 251, 259, that would
give to abandonment alone the effect of an actual re-entry, in making the revived
possession of the owner relate back to the ouster, but this is opposed to the
numerous American authorities which make relation back dependent on an actual
re-entry (see I Smith Lead. Cas. [8th Am. ed. 1885] 1398, 38 Cyc. 1012; I9 C. J.
1236). The American courts have been just as loath to find a constructive re-entry
as they have been ready to find a constructive possession incident to the title and a
good statement of the latter doctrine is to be found in Malloy v. Bruden just
preceding the dictum in question.
Challis argues that the judges in Trustees' Agency Co. v. Short must have
been inventing a new kind of remitter (op. cit. supra note 20); but the terms
seisin, disseisin and remitter occurred neither in the arguments nor in the judgment
(Sweet, op. cit. supra note 22).
"See Lightwood, Possession, 63; Sweet, op. cit. supra note 22; and the
authorities cited supra note 13.
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TACKING
A more difficult question arises where instead of an abandonment
by the first adverse holder and a resulting vacancy, we have him ousted
by a second adverse holder who holds until after the statutory period
has run from the first ouster. There is here no vacancy and as the
land is at all times in the hostile possession of some one else, no proper
place for the application of the rule that in general title draws to itself
possession. In such a case, is the old owner's right to enter, his right
to an action, his right of property, gone? On the other hand, what
of the rights of the adverse holders? There have been three distinct
solutions to these problems in the Anglo-American law; first, that of the
statutes of limitations of 32 Henry VIII7 and 21 James 128 as read into
the old disseisin; second, that of the Real Property Limitation Act of
1833; third, that of the American doctrine of adverse possession.
Read into the old scheme of disseisin, the statute of limitations of
James I meant that the statute was added to descent cast.as a means
of tolling or cutting off the right of entry of the disseisee. 29 As the
burden was on the plaintiff in ejectment to prove that he had at least a
right of entry, the loss of the right of entry meant also the loss of the
right to ejectment and in the ordinary case the resort to the old real
actions until they were barred under the statute of Henry VIII.
30 But
as the barring of the right of entry did not ordinarily mean the barring
of the right to the real actions, so the barring of the real actions did
not necessarily mean the barring of the right of entry.
31 More impor-
tant than either statute in the clearing up of titles was the Statute of
Fines (1487) 4 Hen. VII, c. 24, which unlike them was not directed at
any particular remedy but in the proper case cut off all claims.
32
Despite these statutes, a saying current in Littleton's time that "a right
cannot die" gained a certain authority as a maxim of the common law.
33
(i54o) 32 Hen. VIII, c. z
(1624) 21 Jac. I, c. i6.
22 Smith Lead. Ca•s. (8th Am. ed. i885) 661-2; Langdell, Summary of Equity
Pleading (2d ed. '883) 142
Langdell, op. cit. supra note 29, at pp. 132 and 4I.
Hunt v. Burn (702, Q. B.) 2 Salk. 422; Lightwood, Possession, I59;
Finlason's note, 3 Reeves, History of English Law (2d Finlason's ed. i869) 310;
2 Preston, Abstracts of Title (2d ed. 1824) 350; i ibid. 266.
Lightwood, Possession, i56-15&
Littleton, Tenures, *478; Coke, Littleton, *279 b; Butler's note, ibid. (ist Am.
ed. 1853) *278 b; 2 Preston, Abstracts of Title (2d ed. 1824) 333; Meredith, A
Paradox of Sugden's (I918) 34(LAw Q. REV. 253. In Littleton's time there was
much more reason for saying t "a right cannot die" than either at an earlier
.or a later period of the common'law, for the Statute of Non-claim of (1361) 34
Ed. III, c. I6, had done away with the prescriptive effect of fines and the gradual
lengthening of the periods of limitations to over 2oo years had left the statutes of
limitation without meaning. It does not appear that the maxim was current in
Bracton's day. See 2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed.
i899) 141. Its currency in Littleton's day was probably due to the influence of
the Canon Law. See Maine, Ancient Law (3d Am. ed. x864) 276.
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Under both the statutes of Henry VIII34 and James 135 the burden of
proving seisin or possession within the statutory period was on the
old owner, although this burden must have been lightened by the
presumption of their continuance.8 6 The real issue was as to when
that seisin or possession had ceased or as to whether it had been
restored during the statutory period. It did not turn on the length of
time there had been an action against any individual nor on the merit or
demerit of the one in possession. It was immaterial therefore whether
the disseisee had been kept out by a succession of disseisors or by
persons with a continuous claim of title or by a single disseisor.
3 7
The English Real Property Limitation Act of 1833, 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c.
27, unlike the statute of James I, was a direct limitation on the action of
ejectment.38 Moreover, with certain exceptions, it did away with the
old real actions, 9 created one period of limitation for entries and
actions alike,4 0 and provided that at the end of the period of limita-
tion the right and title of the party out of possession should be extin-
guished.4 - Further it eliminated descent cast42 and any argument that
the statute was to operate on analogy to the old descent cast by making
the statute run from dispossession instead of disseisin.43  It "changed
the meaning of 'right of entry,' making it signify simply the right of
an owner to the possession of land of which another person has the
actual possession, whether the owner's estate is devested or not.""
With "right of entry," now incident to ownership, instead of a techni-
cal right, distinguished from "right of property," which a plaintiff
had had to prove to entitle him to ejectment, it might have been
supposed that the burden of proof that the statute had run would have
been shifted to the defendant,4" but on the ground that the statute
extinguishes the right as well as bars the remedy,48 the burden of
proving that his right has not been barred still remains with the old
owner.4 7  But wherever the burden of proof should have been it was
expressly provided that the statute should run from "dispossession or
" Langdell, op. cit. supra note 29, sec. I2; Stearns, Real Actions (1824) 241.
'Lord Mansfield in Taylor d. Atkyns v. Horde (1757, Y. B.) i Burr. 69, 119;
Langdell, op. cit. supra note 29, secs. 116, 123.
'See Stearns, Real Actions (1824) 241, and Cole v. Heydon (i86o, Q. B.) i
L. T. R- 439.







Langdell, op. cit. supra note 29, sec. 125.
'Ibid. sec. 126.
'Ibid. sec. x26; Dawkins v. Penrhyn (1877, C. A.) L. R. 6 Ch. 318, (1878,
H. L.) L. R 4 A. C. 51.
47I9 Halsbury, Laws of England (19ii) 183.
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discontinuance of possession" 48 so that, as under the older statutes, it is
the time at which the possession is lost that is the material thing and not
what happens to the property afterwards. So far was this carried at
first, that a mere discontinuance of possession was held sufficient to set
the statute running whether anyone else took possession or not,
40 but it
was felt to be anomalous to have the statute run except in favor of some-
one and so the literal interpretation of the statute was abandoned.
50 It
was under the influence of these later cases that the Privy Council
reached its decision in Trustees Agency Co. v. Short.
51 Already how-
ever in Doe in dem. Goody v. Carter" it had been taken for granted by
the court that the statute would continue to run notwithstanding there
was no link to connect the possession of the defendant with that of her
husband and with the stress that is laid on loss of possession by the
statute this result is hard to avoid. The unfortunate consequence in
such a case is that the old owner's title is lost and the ownership left
for the time being in suspense.
5 3
Instead of applying to the recovery of land the theory of the English
statutes of limitation as outlined above, Professor Ballantine has
suggested that the statute be made to run from the accrual of the cause
of action, but that the accrual of the cause of action need not be fixed
once and for all at the time of the original dispossession, that in fact
where a second adverse possessor has ejected a first before -the statute
has run in the latter's favor, a new cause of action arises in favor of the
owner against the second adverse possessor and that the statute
commences to run all over again.
54 If the modern action for the
recovery of land were in effect the old assize of novel disseisin there
would be much to say for this view. The cause of action would be the
disseisin committed by the defendant or by the one under whom he
claimed, and a new disseisin would set the statute running anew. But if
the modern action for the recovery of land be considered a tort action at
all,55 it would seem to be based on the withholding of possession from the
one entitled rather than on an ouster, and a new cause of action would
seem to arise with each successive holding whether in privity with the
preceding holding or not. Logically Professor Ballantine's theory would
prevent tacking in any case just as the English theory would allow it in
all cases. Neither result is satisfying and the true explanation would
"Sec. 3.
'Doe v. Bramnston (1835, K. B.) 3 Ad. & El. 63; Lightwood, Possession, 196.
McDonnell v. McKinty (x847, Q. B.) io Ir. L. 514, 526; Sminth v. Lloyd,
(1854) 9 Exch. 562; Lightwood, Possession, 195.
Supra note 39.
(1847) 9 Q. B. 863.
See Langdell, op. cit. supra note 29, sec. 125.
Title by Adverse Possession (1918) 32 HA.v. L. Rav. 156.
"Ejectment (notwithstanding its origin) is in substance purely in rein (the
damages recovered being only nominal)." Langdell, op. cit. sapra note 29, sec.
125. See also sec. 115.
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seem to be that of Langdell, that the situation is primarily not one of
remedy but of the acquisition of ownership.5 6 It was in prescription
and not in the limitation of actions that he saw the approved solution,
but he failed to find prescription in the English law except perhaps
under the Statute of Fines or the Real Property Limitation Act of
1833 5 and his study did not include the American authorities.
5  On
the other hand, Ames thought he saw in the cases arising under the Act
of 1833 and in the American authorities 9 a true prescription," and
this he read into the older law. In so far as the American authorities
at least are concerned it is believed that Ames was right, but that because
of his failure to distinguish between adverse possession and disseisin, he
failed to notice the essentially positive character of the American
doctrine as contrasted with the essentially negative character of the
English,81 and the resulting difference in the matter of tacking. A
moment spent on this may not be out of place.
'Ibid. see. 121. " Ibid. sec. 122. "Ibid. sec. 54, note i.
Ames, 3 Select Essays, 577.
Ibid. at p. 567.
It is still customary to treat the acquisition of ificorporeal hereditaments by
long user under the head of prescription, but not the like acquisition of title
to the land itself. Hammond (in note 52 to Blackstone, Commentaries
[Hammond's ed. i89o] bk. 2, ch. 17) has traced the maxim that "no prescription
can give a title to lands" back from Blackstone to Saint Germain, Doctor and
Student (518) dial. i, ch. 8, but shows that Littleton and even Coke applied
prescription to corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments alike. It seems never to
have been questioned that a tenancy in common might be prescribed for. Littleton,
Tenures, *3xo; Coke, Littleton, *95 b. The singular doctrine came to be advanced
that there was something about "lands and other corporeal substances" that
made prescription inapplicable to them (2 Blackstone, Cofmentaries, *264). To
a considerable extent this was a matter of mere words, for Blackstone himself said
that "actual possession . . . . may, by length of time, and negligence of him who
hath the right, by degrees ripen into a perfect and defeasible title" (2 Commeln-
taries, *196), and Lord Holt and Lord Mansfield declared twenty years possession
a positive title equivalent to a descent cast. (See infra notes 74 and 76.) But
neither statute of limitation was itself a bar to all right in the owner (see supra
pp. 5, 6, Doe v. Reade [18o7, K. B.] 8 East, 353, Pollock and Wright, Possession
it the Common Law [1888] 99) and the maxim that a right cannot die still had
currency. Supra note 33. Accordingly prescription as to incorporeal heredita-
ments was contrasted with limitation as to corporeal hereditaments but the analogy
between them would not down and found expression in the application to the
latter of the term "negative prescription" which Cruise (Digest [3d Am. ed. 1827]
tit. XXI, ch. I, sees. 5, 6, 'ch. 2) derived from the civilians (Hammond,
ibid. note 53). The English Act of 1833 left no question about the extinguishment
of all the old owner's right but it was in a most thoroughgoing manner an act of
limitation rather than an act of prescription and still fundamentally negative.
See Campbell's note, Austin, Jurisprudence (5th ed. 1885) 493, and Wharton,
Conveyancing (i851) 537. In the language of Salmond (Jurisprudence [6th ed.
1920] 41) "the imperfect negative" prescription of the earlier period was replaced
by the "perfect negative prescription" of the Act of 1833.
As a matter of fact the interaction between prescription for incorporeal
hereditaments and the limitation of actions for the recovery of land, has always
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Disseisin and the English Act of 1833 were alike in stressing the
loss of seisin or possession. Under disseisin indeed the loss of seisin
was very serious even though the statute had not run. Gradually the
position of the old owner became worse and worse until finally only the
shadow of a right remained.62  With the rise of the use the days of the
"beatitude of seisin" had ceased and it was the disadvantage of its loss
rather than the advantage of its presence that became conspicuous under
the general head of disseisin. Disseisin was as negative as its name
and the same thing was true of dispossession which took its place under
the Act of 1833. Both looked to the demerit of the one out of posses-
sion, rather than to the merit of the one in possession. Both stressed
the laches or acquiescence of the old owner rather than the possible
quieting of title in a new owner.63  Langdell on the other hand argued
been very active. 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 2028. And in the
United States the tendency has been to favor the analogy of the statute rather
than any theory of a lost grant. Ibid. 2o30. Furthermore the treatment of
"prescription" and "adverse possession" in the United States has developed along
similar lines. In an early case, Hawk v. Sensemam (182o, Pa.) 6 Serg. & R. 21,
it was held that for the statute to operate there had to be "an actual, con-
tinued, visible, notorious, distinct, and hostile possession." Compare this with
the requisites which Reeves gives for both adverse possession and prescription. 2
Reeves, Real Property (19o9) sec. 1028. The best discussion of prescription in
its wider aspect in the Anglo-American law is that by Hammond in his notes to 2
Blackstone, Commentaries (Hammond's ed. 189o) ch. 17.
' Maitland, "Mystery of Seisin," 3 Select Essays in; Anglo-American Legal
History (1909) 591, 593.
'Ames, 3 Select Essays, 567. Whether the tolling of a right of entry should
depend on the merit of the possessor or the demerit of the one out of
possession varied at times in the English law. At first a delay of only a few days
tolled the entry. Maitland, The Beatitude of Seisin (1888) 4 LAw Q. Rav. 24, 31.
Then the time was extended. Ibid. 286, 296. Then the emphasis shifted to the
possessor and he must be in by title and not by tort (ibid.) until the only kind of a
title that would toll an entry was a descent cast. Ibid. 298. Then the siatute of
James I was passed and Holt, C. J., likened a possession for twenty years to a
descent cast (Stokes v. Berry [1699, K. B.] 2 Salk. 421). But descent cast
depended upon a previous devestment of the freehold, whether by a disseisin, an
abatement or an intrusion, and although mistake might prevent an unlawful entry
from amounting to one of these (Blunden v. Baugh [1632, K B.] Cro. Car. 302)
the general rule was that the wrongdoer could not qualify his own wrong. Infra
inst. 2. In so far therefore as the statute of James I depended on one of these
aicts, the fact of disseisin and the delay in bringing the action therefore were the
important considerations and not the merits of the possession. The shift from
disseisin to adverse possession as the basis for the running of the statute showed a
tendency to look to the one in possession, but this shift never got far in England
and the Act of 1833 went even further than the old disseisin in minimizing the
importance of the intention with which or the character in which the possession
was held. Pollock and Wright, op. cit. supra note 61, at p. 9o. It further
emphasized the importance of acquiescence by providing that in cases of concealed
fraud the statute should not run until the discovery of the fraud or until with
reasonable diligence the fraud might have been discovered. Lightwood, Posses-
sion, 245.
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that "the thing to be looked at is the possession of the defendant-not
the want of possession in the plaintiff""4 and while admitting that the
Statute of James I did not depart from the traditional English view
of negation, could yet say of it that "the courts came naturally and
inevitably to regard the defendant's position as the important considera-
tion; and hence out of this statute has grown the doctrine of adverse
possession."8 5  Adverse possession was therefore fundamentally
opposed to disseisin in being affirmative and in the United States it had
its chance to work out its destiny as a true prescription.
All three of the English types of statutes of limitations for the
recovery of land have been common in the United States, but the courts
have felt singularly free from the language of the statutes"" and from
theories of limitation of actions. On the principle that ownership or
title drew to itself possession until an adverse possession was clearly
shown, 67 the burden of the statute was removed from the old owner
and placed on the adverse claimant.68 The statute became an affirma-
tive defense as urged by Langdell,6 9 although except under reformed
legislation it did not have to be pleaded.7 0  Furthermore although few
of the statutes had anything to say about title,7 1 adverse possession was
held to affect the right and not merely the remedy,72 and indeed it was
on this ground that it was held that the statute did not have to be
pleaded.73  In Lord Mansfield's original statement of the doctrine of
adverse possession he had stated that twenty years adverse possession
was a "positive title" to the defendant in ejectment and took away the
"right of possession" of the plaintiff.7 4  He said that twenty years
adverse possession is a positive title and not that it gives a positive title,
"Langdell, Equity Pleading, sec. 121.
'Ibid. sec. 123.
662 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed., 1920) 1918.
' Jackson v. Sellick (1811, N. Y.) 8 Johns. 202, 208; Lund v. Parker (1824)
3 N. H. 49; cases cited supra note 14.
' Sheariman v. Irvine's Lessee (8o8, U. S.) 4 Cranch, 367; Hawk v. Sensenan,
(1820, Pa.) 6 Serg. & R. 21; Rung v. Shoneberger (1833, Pa.) 2 Watts, 23;
Brown v. King (1842, Mass.) 5 Metc. 173; Herbert v. Hanrick (1849) 16 Ala.
58r, 594; Edmonston v. Shelton (1857) 49 N. C. 451; H.. B. and J. W. Wallace's
note in 2 Smith Lead. Cas. (5th Am. ed.) 566; 2 C. J. 262.
Equity Pleading, sec. 126. Langdell's argument concerned the English Act of
1833 but is even more pertinent to acts of limitation in the United States.
2 C. J. 258; 21 Ann. Cas. 1244 note; 4 Am. St. Rep. 382 note.
Exceptional statutes in this regard are: Hemingway's Miss. Code, 1917, sec.
2458; 3 N. J. Comp. Sts. 1911, 3172; R. I. Gen. Laws, 19o9, ch. 256; S. C. C. C. P.
1912, sec. 134; Complete Tex. Sts. 192o, art. 5679.
Ames, 3 Select Essays, 569; 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 1978;
2 C. J. 251.
" Trowbridge v. Royce (1772, Conn. Super. Ct.) i Root, 5o; Hill v. Bailey
(1879) 8 Mo. App. 85; Sutton v. Clark (9o1) 59 S. C. 440, 38 S. E. 15o; 2 C. J.
258.
T 4Taylor d. Atkyns v. Horde (I757, K. B.) 1 Burr 6o, iig.
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but it was easy to slip from the one expression to the other, 
7 and with
the single period of limitation which had come to prevail in most of the
United States long before the Act of 1833, it was easy to identify the
positive title thus gained with ownership. We may almost say it was
inevitable.76 The burden of proof henceforth was on the one who
wished to take advantage of the statute-of limitation to show that a good
title had been gained by adverse possession and if he failed to do so the
old title remained and with it the remedies incident to title.
In the United States therefore the emphasis is not on the one out of
possession but on the one in possession.
7 7  Good faith aside,7 8 it has
" The shift is seen in the quotation from Sir Thomas Plumer, Master of the
Rolls, in Chohnondely v. Clinton (i82o, Ch.) 2 Jac. & W. I, i56, which Ames
gives immediately after the quotation from Lord Mansfield. 3 Select Essays, at
p. 568. See also Runnington, Ejectmnent (ist Am. ed. i8o6) 58, and Pederick v.
Searle (i819, Pa.) 5 Serg. & R. 236.
"In Stokes v. Berry (1699, K. B.) 2 Salk. 42i, Holt, C. J., had said that
twenty years possession is a "good title." This with Lord Mansfield's state-
ment and the statements of Blackstone, supra note 6I, and Butler in his note
to Coke, Littleton, *239 coupled with uniform periods of limitation and the
prevalent application in the United States of notions of ownership and posses-
sion to land made way for the instantaneous and practically universal recogni-
tion of the positive acquisition of ownership by adverse possession, Once it was
stated. That an "indefeasible" or "perfect" title could be gained under the
statute was stated by Gibson, C. J., and his Pennsylvania colleagues in the
forties (see Gregg v. Blacknore [i84o] io Watts, 192; Watson v. Gregg, ibid.
289; Grafins v. Tottenham [1841] I Watts & Serg. 488; Leeds v. Bender
[1843] 6 Watts & Serg. 315), but the first adequate statements of the modern
American doctrine seem to have occurred in 185O in School District No. 4, in;
Winthrop v. Benson (185o) 31 Me. 381, and Biddle v. Mellon (85o) 13 Mo. 335.
The opinion of Wells, J., in the Maine case was quoted by Washburn, 3 Real
Property (3d ed. 1868) 145, and has become a classic.
The danger is not that the possession of the defendant will be lost sight of
but that the fact that statutes of limitation are involved will be overlooked. It
is apt to be stated that adverse possession for the statutory period will give a
good title without qualification whereas the period is likely to be extended
greatly through disability of the old owner or the existence of future estates.
The great extension of the statutory suit to quiet title (see 4 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence [4th ed. I919] sec. 1396) is but a natural outcome of looking
at the matter from the point of view of the one that is in possession, rather
than from the point of view of the one that is out.
" The conflict in the matter of good faith as a requisite of the adverse posses-
sion which will set the statute of limitations running is more apparent than real.
The leading case to require good faith of an adverse possessor independently
of statute was Livingston v. Peru Iron Co. (1832, N. Y. Senate) 9 Wend. 511,
and that case involved the validity of a conveyance by the real owner and not
the statute of limitations at all as did Moore v. Worley (i865) 24 Ind. 8r,
Pennington v. Flock (1883) 93 Ind. 378 and Woodward v. McReynolds (1849,
Wis.) 2 Pinn. 268, which followed it. There has doubtless been an under-
current of feeling that it is bad morals if not bad law (May v. Dobbins [i9o6],
166 Ind. 331, 77 N. E. 353) to allow a possession commencing in fraud or
dishonesty to ripen into title (Waterhouse v. Martin [1824, Tenn.] Peck, 374,
4o9) and where color of title is material there is considerable authority that
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been a question of whether the one in possession should have acquired
title rather than whether the one out of possession should have lost it7
9
It has been a question of quieting the title that deserves it rather than
of penalizing an owner who has slept on his rights.8 0 It has been a
a dishonest or fraudulent deed is not even colorable (see note to State v. King
[1915] 77 W. Va. 37, 84 S. E. 9o2, L. R. A. 1918 E 1049), but in Humbert v.
Trinity Church (184o, N. Y. Senate) 24 Wend. 587, Cowen, J., pointed out that
in Livingston v. Peru Iron Co., supra, the statute of limitations was not involved
and denied that the requirement of good faith should be read into the statute
where the recovery of land was involved any more than in cases of contract
or tort, or the efficacy of the statute would be seriously impaired. A like view
has been taken in other jurisdictions (Smith v. Roberts [I879] 62 Ala. 83; May
v. Dobbins, supra; Dawson v. Falls City Boat Club [1904] 136 Mich. 259, 99
N. W. 17; Love v. Love's Lessee [1829, Tenn.] 2 Yerg. 288; Lampman v. Van
Aistyne, [1896] 94 Wis. 417, 69 N. W. 171) where a tendency towards a require-
ment of good faith had at some time shown itself. See the Indiana, Tennessee
and Wisconsin cases cited supra and Abercrombie v. Baldwin (1849) 15 Ala.
363 and Campau v. Lafferty (188o) 43 Mich. 429, 431, 5 N. W. 648. Only in
Iowa (Jones v. Hockman [1861] 12 Iowa, OI; Goulding v. Shonquist [19131
I59 Iowa, 647, 141 N. W. 124), and perhaps Washington (Ramsey v. Wilson
[199o] 52 Wash. iii, ioo Pac. 177; Skansi v. Novak [1915] 84 Wash. 39, 146
Pac. i6o), does the general requirement of good faith seem to be established
apart from statutory enactment. 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 192o) 194o.
" This is manifest in the identity of the requisites of adverse possession and
"prescription" (supra note 61) and especially in the requirement of claim of title
and of privity of estate in tacking. The requirement that the possession shall
be open and notorious ensures that the acquisition of another man's land by
means "of the statute shall at least be made openly and not by stealth.
" Statutes of limitation, per se, look to the cutting off of stale claims rather
than to the quieting of title in the defendant. This was rationalized by Gibson,
C. J., in his catchy statement that, "the statute protects the occupant, not for
his merit, for he has none, but for the demerit of his antagonist in delaying
the contest beyond the period assigned for it, when papers may be lost, facts
forgotten, or witnesses dead." Sailor v. Hertzogg (1845, Pa.) 2 Barr, 182, 185.
There is much in the English Act of 1833 to justify his brilliant *rhetoric (supra
note 63), and the requirement of the American cases that the possession be
open and notorious is commonly placed on the ground that without knowledge
or means of knowledge on the part of the true owner, he cannot be said to
acquiesce or be guilty of laches and so should have his action. It is believed
however that this rationalization has been greatly overworked. Lord Blackburn
showed this to be true in the case of "prescription" in Dalton v. Angus (1881,
H. L.) L. R. 6 A. C. 74o, 817, and it would seem in the limitation of actions also
that while acquiescence may serve as a moral justification to those who make a
fetish of the right of the individual, it is not the only principle nor even the
chief principle involved. If it were, the statute would not run in cases of
concealed fraud (see Humbert v. Trinity Church, supra note 78, at p. 606),
and the law of intervening and successive disabilities would have to be made
over, see Griswold v. Butler (1819) 3 Conn. 277. In so far as the cutting off
of stale claims is the object of statutes of limitation neither the moral guilt of
the defendant nor of the plaintiff would seem to be the vital consideration,
but the public weal. That the cutting off of stale claims rather than the quieting
of title in the possessor should have characterized the older English statutes
of limitation may be accounted for by the fact that the great method of quiet-
ing titles was not the statutes of limitation but the fine. The statutes of limita-
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question of right or title first, and of remedy afterwards.8 If a new
title is created the old is gone and with it the old remedies. Such is the
American doctrine of adverse possession. It is a doctrine of affirma-
tive prescription read into the statutes of limitation by the courts, a
doctrine of inchoate title82 ripening into ownership with the aid of the
statute.
Whether American adverse possession meets the requirements of a
true affirmative prescription is put to the test where the time of succes-
sive adverse possessions must be tacked to make up the full statutory
period. If the prescription is negative, as under the English Act of
1833, the extinguishment of the old title has logical priority to the
creation of the new and the first question to ask is whether the old title
is extinguished. If the prescription is positive the creation of the new
title has logical priority and the first question to ask is whether a new
title has come into being. If this be so, the old inconsistent title is
destroyed.8 If the first question is that of the destruction of the old
tion were relatively unimportant. 2 Preston, Abstracts of Title (2d ed. 1824) 333.
In the United States, however, the fine was almost unknown (Bordwell, Seisin
and Disseisin [r921] 34 Hav. L. REV. 717, 726), and adverse possession under
the statute took its place. Chief Justice Marshall's statement that "the statute
of limitations is intended, not for the punishment of those who neglect to assert
their rights by suit, but for the protection of those who have remained in posses-
sion under colour of a title believed to be good" (Mclver v. Ragan [1817,
U. S.] 2 Wheat. 25, 29), demanded more of the adverse possessor than does
the present law in requiring color of title in good faith, but it is believed to
have expressed the prevalent attitude of the Ameiican courts from the beginning
that the statutes of limitation of actions for the recovery of land have been not
in the nature of penal statutes but of statutes of repose. See Ballantine, Title
by Adverse Possession (1918) 32 HARv. L. REv. 135, but see also 2 Tiffany, Real
Property (2d ed. 192o) 1920.
'Of course, if it is clear that the statute has not run, there can be no ques-
tion of title in the adverse possessor, but in doubtful cases, and it is in these
that theory makes a difference, the American courts have made the loss of the
action depend upon the acquisition of the new title and not the other way around.
A good example of this is to be found in the law of disclaimer, infra. The dif-
ference between adverse possession in England and the United States at the
present time would seem to be that in England adverse possession depends upon
the running of the statute, in the United States the running of the statute
depends upon adverse possession.
'The doctrine of disseisin was a doctrine of seisin, defeasible at first but
becoming more and more difficult to defeat, until finally it became indefeasible.
The doctrine of adverse possession is a doctrine of possession ripening into
ownership.
' This is well expressed by Salmond. He says :-"In many cases the two
forms of prescription coincide. The property which one person loses through
long dispossession is often at the same time acquired by someone else through
long possession. Yet this is not always so, and it is necessary in many instances
to know whether legal effect is given to long possession, in which case the pre-
scription is positive, or to long want of possession, in which case the prescrip-
tion is negative. I may, for example, be continuously out of possession of my
land for twelve years, without any other single person having continuously held
DISSEISIN AND ADVERSE POSSESSION
title,' the loss of possession for the statutory period or the fact that
during that period the land has always been in the hands of an adverse
possessor, although not of the same adverse possessor, nor of adverse
possessors holding under the same claim, may well be all-sufficient. But
if the first question is that of the creation of a new title, then it will be
necessary that the adverse possessors should hold under the same claim,
and in order that this claim and the rights acquired by one adverse
possessor should pass to his successor, it is necessary that there should
be what for lack of a better name may be called privity of estate s.8
American adverse possession does meet this test of positive prescrip-
tion85 and that the requirement of privity of estate was generally recog-
nized even before the acquirement of good title under the statute was,
shows how naturally the American courts took to the prescriptive acquisi-
tion of title to land and explains the immediate and practically universal
acceptance of that doctrine once it was stated.
(To be continued)
possession of it for that length of time. It may have been in the hands of a
series of trespassers against me and against each other. In this case, if the
legally recognized form of prescription is positive, it is inoperative, and I retain
my ownership. But if the law recognizes negative prescription instead of posi-
tive (as in this case our own system does) my title will be extinguished."
Jurisprudence (6th ed. 1920) 409.
a' The statement in Illinois Steel Co. v. Paczocha (19o7) 139 Wis. 23, 119
N. W. 550, that it is merely the pnssession that is transferred and not the
possessory title, would make the requirement of privity meaningless (see Ballan-
tine, op. cit. supra note 8o, at p. 149) and accordingly we find the same court in
Illinois Steel Co. v. Budziss (igoo) lo6 Wis. 499, 515, 81 N. W. 1O27, treating
it as an arbitrary requirement read by the courts into the statute, but the late
views of the Wisconsin court are those of negative and not affirmative pre-
scription, and their views as to privity are the logical consequence of their
general theory. That the adverse possessor "acquires something which he may
transfer to another" was laid down by Tilghman, C. J., in Overfield v. Christie
(Pa.) 7 Serg. & R. 173, as long ago as 1821.
'That the requirement of privity is almost universal, see Ballantine, op. cit.
supra note 8o, at p. 147; 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 1971; 2 C. 3.
84. A few early cases, of which Fanning v. Wilcox (i8o8, Conn.) 3 Day, 258,
and Shannon v. Kinny (1817, Ky.) i A. K. Marsh, 3, are the most conspicuous,
followed the negative rule of the English law, but the view that is generally
accepted in the United States to-day was adopted as early as i8o6 in New York
(Brandt v. Ogden, I Johns. 156; Jackson v. Thomas (18ig) 16 Johns. 293),
1821 in Pennsylvania (Overfield v. Christie, supra note 84), and 1828 in Massa-
chusetts (Ward v. Bartholomew, 6 Pick. 409). Under the apparent influence
of Ames the Massachusetts court showed somewhat of a leaning towards the
English doctrine in Wishart v. McKnight (19Ol) 178 Mass. 356, 59 N. E. 1028,
but contented themselves with repudiating the case of Potts v. Gilbert (1819,
C. C. D. Pa. & N. J.) 3 Wash. 475, which had been frequently cited in the
earlier Massachusetts cases and which had intimated that an adverse possessor
had nothing he could transfer. Potts v. Gilbert is largely responsible for the
notion of a constructive gap where there is no privity. This notion of a ficti-
tious gap has done much to obscure the whole subject. For a thorough examina-
tion of the authorities, see Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 8o.
